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MARYLAND v. KING: PER SE UNREASONABLENESS, THE 
GOLDEN RULE, AND THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABASES 
David H. Kaye∗ 
In License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divid-
ed Court,1 Professor Erin Murphy deftly summarizes and situates the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Maryland v. King.2  As she observes, the 
case can be read narrowly or broadly.3  Murphy reads the case broadly, 
suggesting that King is “a watershed moment”4 that portends “a new 
Fourth Amendment in town”5 and that its “reimagination of the idea 
of ‘identity’”6 “arguably invite[s] a new era of genetic identification.”7  
Here, I offer a less dramatic view of the doctrinal significance of King 
and the limits of the majority’s identification theory.  I also offer a pre-
cept for officials seeking to expand or improve DNA databases in this 
new era. 
I.  THE SAME OLD, SAME OLD CONFLICTED 
FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
In some twenty opinions, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
Fourth Amendment generally makes searches conducted without a 
warrant and probable cause unreasonable per se unless they fall within 
a categorical exception.8  Typically, the per-se-unreasonable-with-
exceptions (PSUWE) rule suffices to invalidate warrantless searches 
with no further analysis of the totality of the circumstances.  As shown 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Distinguished Professor of Law and Weiss Family Faculty Scholar, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity School of Law.  I am grateful to Kit Kinports for comments on a draft of this Response. 
 1 Erin Murphy, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Comment: License, Registration, Cheek 
Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161 (2013). 
 2 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 3 Murphy, supra note 1, at 173. 
 4 Id. at 161. 
 5 Id. at 163. 
 6 Id. at 177. 
 7 Id. at 179. 
 8 For recent examples, see David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA 
and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1102–03, 1117–19 (2013).  If Justice 
Scalia is now part of a “nascent alliance” of four justices who “believe in the warrant require-
ment,” Murphy, supra note 1, at 187, he has radically altered his views.  It is more likely that his 
position in King stems from an affinity for bright-line rules and that, King notwithstanding, he 
has yet to foresake his position that there is no “general rule” requiring warrants — only a rule 
that they are required when the pre-Constitution common law required them and when “changes 
in the surrounding legal rules . . . make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once 
was not.”  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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in Figure 1, however, there are situations in which the Court balances 
individual and state interests to ascertain reasonableness.9 
 
When the Court does balance interests in Fourth Amendment cases, 
it almost always stays within the PSUWE framework.  First, to decide 
whether to recognize a new categorical exception and how to define its  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 The Figure comes from David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? The Fourth Amendment and 
DNA Databases After Maryland v. King, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming May 
2014).  It does not include cases on whether excessive force is used to conduct a search or seizure.  
E.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (balancing to conclude that shooting a fleeing suspect 
was unreasonable). 
 10 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 11 E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 12 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 13 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 14 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
FIGURE 1: SITUATIONS IN WHICH BALANCING DETERMINES 
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boundaries,15 the Court must balance.16  Second, within the PSUWE 
framework, program-specific balancing occurs in the sprawling catego-
ry of special-needs and administrative-search cases.  The justification 
for balancing within this exception is that the State has special inter-
ests beyond the acquisition of evidence for criminal prosecutions.  
When evidence production is the sole objective, the balance already is 
conclusively presumed to favor a warrant and probable cause (or an 
applicable exception).17  When more is at stake — when, for example, 
the government randomly tests all weapons-wielding drug enforcement 
agents to ensure that they are not using drugs18 — this presumption is 
less applicable. 
The balancing in King, however, does not fit into either of these 
two PSUWE categories — at least not as currently conceived.  The 
special-needs exception requires that the “primary purpose” of the pro-
gram be something other than acquiring evidence or contraband.19  As 
Murphy indicates (and every Justice realized), the primary purpose of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 A boundary-defining case that attracts Murphy’s attention is Bailey v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 1031 (2013).  Bailey concerns a per se rule for seizures of the person, which ordinarily require 
probable cause but not a warrant.  One exception to this per se rule permits “officers executing a 
search warrant ‘to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted,’” id. 
at 1037  (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)), even though the detention is 
“without probable cause to arrest for a crime,” id., and without “particular suspicion that an indi-
vidual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to the officers,” id. at 1037–38.  
According to Murphy, “Justices Thomas, Breyer and Alito in dissent advocated a general balanc-
ing approach.”  Murphy, supra note 1, at 186.  Yet the dissent agreed “that the question involves 
drawing a line of demarcation granting a categorical form of detention authority.”  Bailey, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The dissenting Justices did not challenge the statement of 
three other Justices that “the ‘general rule’ is ‘that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable” 
only if based on probable cause.’”  Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).  Neither did they doubt the majority’s nearly identical observa-
tion.  Id. at 1037 (majority opinion).  The disagreement was over the question of how broadly to 
define the categorical exception for detention incident to a search.  The majority wanted a seem-
ingly bright-line rule: the police can detain a person only within “the immediate vicinity of the 
premises to be searched.”  Id. at 1041.  The dissent wanted the exception to extend beyond the 
immediate vicinity to encompass persons “in the process of leaving the premises,” id. at 1049 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d 
Cir. 2011)), but detained “as soon as ‘reasonably practicable,’” id. at 1046.  The dissent considered 
the expanded category to be “based on realistic considerations” related to the underlying reasons 
for having the exception and thus superior to the majority’s categorical rule of “indeterminate ge-
ography.”  Id. at 1049.  However, none of the opinions in Bailey evinces a movement to across-
the-board ad hoc balancing for seizures of the person incident to the execution of a search war-
rant, let alone for searches of people or places. 
 16 See Kaye, supra note 8, at 1103; David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting 
DNA Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 104, 113–20 (2013); Murphy, supra note 
1, at 186. 
 17 See Kaye, supra note 8, at 1112. 
 18 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 19 The Court has found searches to have been unreasonable because of this limitation on the 
special-needs exception in only two cases.  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 
(2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000). 
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Maryland’s law was evidence production.  Neither was the Court fash-
ioning a new exception for certain kinds of biometric data.20  Instead, 
the majority stepped outside the PSUWE framework, which it de-
scribed as defeasible.  This was not the first time the Court had done 
so,21 and it did not swing the door “wide open”22 — at least not wide 
open to a world in which every search will be judged for reasonable-
ness on an ad hoc basis.23  The Court could have discarded the 
PSUWE framework entirely.  Instead, it maintained that King resem-
bled some special-needs balancing cases and then included King in the 
small set of cases in which it balances to ascertain reasonableness even 
though the primary purpose of the search is the production of evidence 
or investigative leads.24 
To be sure, this set is not well defined.  The majority’s elliptical de-
scription of the circumstances in which the per se rule gives way to di-
rect balancing is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of “fami-
ly resemblances.”25  Like Wittgenstein, who deemed it unnecessary to 
articulate any common denominator for a generic term like “games,” 
Justice Kennedy, without articulating any essential factors, pointed to 
a family of searches eligible for direct balancing.  The opinion suggests 
that the most recognizable family trait is that “the search involves no 
discretion that could properly be limited by the ‘interpo[lation of] a 
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement of-
ficer.’”26  As with a policy that always requires inventory searches of 
arrestees,27 a magistrate has nothing to decide with regard to manda-
tory DNA sampling.  This rationale for dispensing with warrants ap-
plies in various special-needs cases, like the inventory search (even 
though it is preceded by a discretionary decision to make an arrest).  It 
also applies to the non-PSUWE case of Illinois v. Lidster,28 in which a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 E.g., Kaye, supra note 8 (recommending an exception for collecting and using biometric data 
under certain conditions).  The State noted this possibility in its petition for certiorari, but the par-
ties studiously ignored it after that. 
 21 The dissent conveniently acted as if, contrary to Figure 1, there never had been a case that 
resorted to balancing to uphold a search or seizure primarily intended to produce evidence for 
investigation or prosecution of a crime. 
 22 Murphy, supra note 1, at 184. 
 23 In Bailey v. United States, the case that Murphy sees as “strikingly” evincing the movement 
to overturn the PSUWE framework, id. at 186, Justice Kennedy — and every other Justice — 
agreed that direct balancing is not generally available.  See supra note 15. 
 24 As shown in Figure 1, those cases are Samson, Knights, Lidster, and now King. 
 25 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (P. M. S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe trans., Wiley-Blackwell rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953). 
 26 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Treas-
ury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)).  When this condition exists, “[t]he need 
for a warrant is perhaps least.”  Id. 
 27 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (standardized inventory procedures are  
appropriate). 
 28 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
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highway checkpoint for solving a hit-and-run case applied to all driv-
ers, rendering pointless a magistrate’s judgment of whether any given 
driver had done anything wrong or had pertinent knowledge.  But the 
other two direct balancing cases, Samson and Knights, are members of 
the family that do not share this feature, leaving the boundaries of the 
non-PSUWE cases obscure. 
Nonetheless, insofar as “a new Fourth Amendment in town”29 goes, 
the fact remains that the majority chose to step outside — but not to 
discard — the PSUWE framework.  This is not an approach to totality 
balancing that advocates of the direct recourse to reasonableness will 
appreciate.  It is not a declaration that “case-by-case assessments un-
der a test as elastic as ‘reasonableness’”30 are the new normal.  If I am 
right that this part of King and the “tendrils”31 in other cases decided 
this past Term are not quite so exceptional, it may not be necessary for 
casebook writers to start over.32  The King analysis does not dethrone 
the PSUWE framework or fundamentally destabilize that regime. 
The case is doctrinally disappointing, I would argue, because it is a 
lost opportunity to devise a candid categorical exception for certain bio-
metric data or to revisit the “primary purpose” limitation on the special 
needs exception.33  First, depending on the “scientific and statutory 
safeguards” noted in King,34 a categorical exception for noninvasive 
biometric data should include fingerprints and might also encompass 
DNA profiles.35  Second, as an alternative to creating a categorical ex-
ception, the Court could have reconsidered whether denying special-
needs balancing to secondary-special-purpose searches is consistent 
with the rationale for engaging in balancing.  The rationale, one would 
think, is that combining the standard law enforcement objective of ev-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Murphy, supra note 1, at 163. 
 30 Id. at 186. 
 31 Id. at 185. 
 32 Id. at 187 (“[I]f freestanding interest balancing is the new touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
inquiry, then casebooks and class discussions deserve overhaul.”).  This is not to say that the ques-
tions Murphy then raises do not belong in casebooks and class discussion.  Quite the contrary. 
 33 Another disappointing aspect of the King Court’s analysis of routine DNA collection before 
conviction is the Court’s failure to consider the dominant function of arrestee DNA sampling as a 
possibly weighty consideration in its own right.  See Kaye, supra note 9 (explaining how this de-
parts from a true totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry and imbues the opinion with an air of  
unreality). 
 34 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 35 Kaye, supra note 8.  Whether a particular program for collecting and using DNA from ar-
restees before any conviction falls within such an exception or is sustainable under a modified 
special-needs balancing is a matter on which I am mildly agnostic.  Much depends on the privacy 
safeguards in the system and the marginal value of the information in criminal investigations.  
Although I have long maintained that the value is limited, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Constitution-
ality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455 (2001), I am not prepared 
to say that it is a complete myth.  In any event, that is an empirical question of more complexity 
than can be discussed here. 
  
44 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 127:39 
 
idence gathering with other functions makes inapposite the presump-
tion that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.  This rationale 
applies to secondary-special-purpose searches just as it does to primary-
purpose ones.  As such, the King Court could have dropped the prob-
lematic primary-purpose limitation and addressed the Maryland pro-
gram as a special-needs case within the PSUWE framework. 
II.  DEFINING IDENTITY AND THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABASES 
The other prong of Murphy’s penetrating paper that I would like 
to discuss is the concern with the use of the word “identification.”  The 
majority’s undifferentiated use of the term incensed the dissent,36 and 
it led Murphy to insist that “almost none of the state or federal statuto-
ry regimes authorizing DNA collection” would prevent the government 
from testing DNA samples for a “violence gene” or “pedophile gene” 
and then “incarcerating people based on a probabilistic predisposition 
to violence or pedophilia.”37 
In ordinary discourse, “identify” can have three meanings.  The 
first is authenticating a person’s identity via some mark or token — a 
name, a password, or a biometric characteristic.  Used in this manner 
and to provide a permanent record of an individual’s identity, DNA is 
similar to photographs, body measurements, and fingerprints.  The sec-
ond meaning is associating a known individual with a location, as 
when a witness to a robbery picks a photograph of an individual from 
a set of mugshots or when a trawl through a fingerprint database of 
known prints produces a hit to a latent print from a crime scene.  Both 
these types of identification, which I will call authentication-
identification and association-identification, respectively, are com-
monplace,38 historically accepted,39 and not deeply invasive of legiti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (excoriating the majority opinion as falling 
below the level expected of a “minimally competent speaker of English”). 
 37 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180. 
 38 Professor Murphy knows “intuitively” that fingerprint databases are not routinely searched 
for matches to latent prints.  Murphy, supra note 1, at 163.  Only they are, every day.  See, e.g., 
Kaye, supra note 8, at 1099, 1131 (noting 50,000 “hits” in 2005); Kathryn Wexler, Pairing Prints 
Rarely Key to Solving Crime, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 19, 1999), 
http://www.sptimes.com/News/121999/news_pf/TampaBay/Pairing_prints_rarely.shtml (“Most of 
the 2,500 cases a year [Florida Department of Law Enforcement] experts run through AFIS are 
‘cold’ cases in which there are no leads other than the print. About 25 percent of those eventually 
are matched with suspects whose prints are in the database because of arrests for unrelated 
crimes.”).  These fingerprint “cold hits,” like DNA hits, sometimes stretch back to crimes commit-
ted decades ago.  See, e.g., State v. Watson, 827 N.W.2d 507 (Neb. 2013); Latent Hit of the Year 
2012, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/news/videos/latent-hit-of-the-year-2012 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013); FBI’S Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) Helps Solve 38 Year-Old Cold Case, CHESAPEAKE EXAMINER, Spring 2011, at 14, 
available at http://www.cbdiai.org/Articles/anon_sp11.pdf. 
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mate privacy interests.40  Third, there is identification in the sense of 
describing someone’s character, health, politics, thoughts, and so on.  
Jane Doe, one could say, has been identified as a communist sympa-
thizer, as a carrier of a disease, or as prone to violence.  In contrast to 
the use of a mark or token in authentication or association-
identification, this trait-identification does not necessarily rely on a set 
of features that serve to distinguish one individual from all (or nearly 
all) other people, and it has much more serious implications for per-
sonal privacy.  As such, why would one assume that a legislator’s vote 
for a computer searchable database of DNA profiles — or a Justice’s 
opinion upholding the database as constitutional for authentication-
identification and association-identification — authorizes or endorses 
trait-identification? 
Whereas the majority opinion blurs the line between the first two 
meanings of “identification,” Murphy elides all three when she asserts 
that laws adopted solely to establish and fund collection of DNA from 
convicted offenders (and later, arrestees) for authentication and crime-
scene matching reach well beyond these contemplated uses.  Her ar-
gument that these laws permit testing people for “the ‘pedophile’ gene” 
or “the ‘violence gene’”41 seems to be that the statutory term “identifi-
cation” reaches to its farthest linguistic limits in the absence of an ex-
press limitation.42  This mode of interpretation overlooks the purpose, 
intent, and original understanding of the statutes that paved the way 
for DNA “identification.”43 
The same unwarranted assumption infects Murphy’s analysis of 
the Court’s use of the word “identification” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.  In a remarkable sleight of hand, she transforms the Court’s 
explicit caution about using DNA samples in ways that would be es-
pecially invasive of privacy into an approbation of many such uses.  
She suggests that when “King says simply that, should police conduct 
testing for ‘predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary 
factors not relevant to identity, that case would present additional pri-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 The earliest case identifying the source of a latent print by perusing a collection of known 
prints occurred in 1902.  Kaye, supra note 8, at 1121. 
 40 See id. at 1134–39; David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of 
“Familial Searching,” 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2013). 
 41 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180. 
 42 Erin Murphy, A Tale of Two Sciences, 110 MICH. L. REV. 909, 915 (2012) (book review) (rea-
soning that “identification purpose” could include “behavioral genetics experimentation” as long as 
“nothing in the law as written . . . clearly proscribes it”). 
 43 The sponsors and supporters of these laws, after all, sold them as association-identification 
systems analogous to fingerprint databases.  To infer the intent of earlier state and federal legisla-
tures from the outer boundaries of what five Justices, writing decades later, might have found to 
be constitutional is unprecedented and unpersuasive.  Cf. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 
(1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of 
an earlier one.”). 
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vacy concerns not present here,’”44 the opinion actually is giving a 
green light to future genetic testing that will incarcerate people for 
having the wrong genes.  But this truncated sentence45 follows several 
others that indicate that the Court is using “identity” and “identifica-
tion” only to denote authentication-identification and association-
identification via the CODIS loci.  The Court’s point was that “law en-
forcement officers analyze DNA for the sole purpose of generating a 
unique identifying number against which future samples may be 
matched.”46  Testing for behavioral traits or other phenotypes would 
be “beyond identification.”47  In contrast, the balancing in King did 
not include the individual interests implicated by genetic tests for men-
tal or physical traits.  It therefore seems extravagant to maintain that 
by accepting the two token-of-identity uses of DNA, the Court implic-
itly approved of genetic testing for “family ties . . . [,] asocial behavior 
or addiction, and . . . violence.”48 
Nevertheless, Murphy may be making a more subtle observation 
about the implications of the majority’s “identification” rationale.  The 
majority reasoned that DNA profiling strictly for authentication-
identification and association-identification advances important state 
interests in pretrial decisionmaking and supervision of arrestees.  But 
why limit DNA analysis to the current, relatively innocuous loci if di-
rect testing for putative violence genes or the like also would serve 
these interests?  Why not allow such direct trait-identification?  “After 
all, law enforcement needs to know just whom it is dealing with.”49 
The answer lies in King’s balancing test.  If the Court were faced 
with troubling trait-identification uses, it easily could distinguish King: 
“that case would present additional privacy concerns not present 
here.”50  Even indulging the very dubious assumption that some of this 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Murphy, supra note 1, at 181. 
 45 The full sentence is: “If in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an 
arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identi-
ty, that case would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”  Maryland v. King, 133 
S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013).  If “for instance” applies to the entire appositive phrase that follows it, 
then trait-identification that is irrelevant to pretrial decisionmaking is just one example of a case 
that could result in a different outcome.  Other forms of trait-identification also could constitute 
unreasonable searches even though they might have some slight value in pretrial decisionmaking. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Quoting an article in the forensic science literature, the Court emphasized that the identify-
ing numbers “are not at present revealing information beyond identification.”  Id. (quoting Sara 
H. Katsanis & Jennifer K. Wagner, Technical Note, Characterization of the Standard and Rec-
ommended CODIS Markers, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. S169, S171 (2013)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The phrase “beyond identification” refers to inferences about phenotypes (observable 
traits) arising from either a causal mechanism or linkage disequilibrium.  See Katsanis & Wagner, 
supra. 
 48 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180. 
 49 Id. 
 50 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added). 
KAYE - FINAL 11/20/13 – 12:11 PM 
2013] THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABASES 47 
 
trait-identification by genes would supply valid predictive data for 
pretrial release decisions or for supervising prisoners, such trait-
identification would implicate more robust claims of genetic privacy.  
When meaningful privacy interests are on the scale, the outcome of di-
rect balancing is not so obvious. 
Thus far, I have suggested that the resort to direct balancing in 
King was unnecessary and unfortunate, but, contrary to the dissenting 
justices, it did not cross a line that had never been crossed before.  
Although King adds to the size of the small family of direct balancing 
cases, these cases remain the exceptions to the normal PSUWE frame-
work.  As for the semantics of “identification,” I have maintained that 
King does not change the statutory meaning of the term, which refers 
to DNA profiles as tokens of identity that distinguish one individual 
from another, and that the majority’s balancing does not commit it to 
upholding all manner of alleged “identification” no matter how inva-
sive of privacy it may be. 
III.  BEYOND DOCTRINE AND WORDS 
Being a constitutional case, King does not address the question of 
whether involvement in the criminal justice system should be the trig-
gering event.  In that regard, it has been said that there is no princi-
pled distinction between taking DNA from arrestees and the rest of 
us51 and that a population-wide database would obviate or mitigate 
many of Murphy’s understandable concerns — disproportionate inclu-
sion of minorities, pretextual arrests to acquire DNA, kinship trawling, 
unregulated local databases, and so on. 
Although universality is too costly at present and might never be 
politically feasible, the idea has an immediate application — as a 
thought-experiment.  Those who have called for serious reflection on a 
universal database tend to accept the premise that Murphy disparages 
— namely, that “DNA sampling [and profiling] is [not] that big of a 
deal.”52  I share this view, at least for a properly designed and adminis-
tered database system (perhaps one that does not retain DNA samples).  
I hope this is not a “general nonchalance about government genetic 
testing,”53 but rather is the result of a more careful inquiry into the in-
terests that DNA profiling realistically threatens.54  Still, I could be 
wrong.  To the extent that well informed observers can differ in their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Richard Lempert, Maryland v. King: An Unfortunate Supreme Court Decision on the Col-
lection of DNA Samples, BROOKINGS UP FRONT (June 6, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www 
.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/06-maryland-king-supreme-court-dna-samples-lempert. 
 52 Murphy, supra note 1, at 175. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Kaye, supra note 8; Kaye, supra note 40. 
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risk assessments, a simple precept should guide the expansion of DNA 
databases.  Legislators and database administrators should do unto 
others as they would to themselves.  They should not adopt or operate 
any DNA identification system unless they would be willing to include 
their own DNA in it.  It is too easy to approve of taking DNA from 
arrestees (or any group) when we presume that we will not be one of 
“them.”55  But if “we” truly conceive of ourselves as the recipients of 
this treatment, then we are more likely to arrive at a system with suf-
ficient safeguards.  And if the benefits of such a system are substantial, 
it could be foolish to foresake them. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 Cf. Lempert, supra note 51 (“We should judge the result in King not with Alonzo King in 
mind but with ourselves, our friends and neighbors standing in his place.”). 
